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Freedom and Truth
in Veritatis Splendor and
the Meaning of Theonomy
LOIS MALCOLM

VERITATIS SPLENDOR is written to address a specific problem: the
lack of harmony between the magisterium’s teaching and “certain
theological positions, encountered in seminaries and faculties of theol
ogy.” The pope perceives a trend within the Roman Catholic Church
— “the spread of numerous doubts and objections of a human and
psychological, social and cultural, religious and even properly theolog
ical nature, with regard to the Church’s moral teachings” (VS #4-5).
He hopes to correct this trend by reinforcing, among other things, the
universality and permanent validity ofnatural law, the link between faith
and morality, and the magisterium’s authority beyond intervening “only
to ‘exhort consciences’ and ‘propose values’ ” in light ofwhich individu
als make their decisions and life choices independently (VS #4-5). But
his concern with ecclesial authority is rooted in a deeper concern over
the rising individualism in contemporary society. He questions whether
the individual’s conscience — and its criteria of “sincerity, authenticity,
and ‘being at peace with oneself’” — should be the supreme tribunal
of moral judgment (VS #32). He questions the loss of an idea of
universal and absolute truth, wondering whether a relativistic concep
tion of morality can provide the very warrants needed to speak out
against the violation of human rights and serious forms of social and
economic justice. Can relativism ensure the values of “justice, solidarity,
honesty, and openness” that are often identified with individual free-
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dom (VS #98)? Thus the core issue in Veritatis Splendor is not simply the
question of ecclesial authority but the more profound modern problem
of “detaching humanfreedom” from its “essential and constitutive rela
tionship to truth” (VS #45, my emphasis). In raising this question, the
pope can be classed with a range of theologians, philosophers, social
scientists, and moral theorists who question whether a moral discourse
restricted to the decisions and choices of autonomous moral agents is
rich enough to provide moral resources for the pressing problems of our
time — human rights abuses, social and economic injustice, and so on
— in the face not only of cultural pluralism but the rise of technological
power.1
Veritatis Splendor contributes to this discussion by defining true
freedom as a “theonomy” that links freedom with absolute truth. In
developing his understanding of freedom, the pope criticizes what he
understands to be the “autonomous” thrust of “recent Roman Catholic
moralists.” Much of his own proposal is developed as a specific critique
of key themes in the Roman Catholic moral theology following the
reforms of Vatican II — for example, its understandings of the “funda
mental option,” “intrinsically evil acts,” the role of the magisterium in
shaping conscience, and so on. The pope’s critics, in turn, question
whether his position does not simply substitute a “heteronomous”
norm for an “autonomous” one.12 This issue between the pope and his
critics is important theologically because it drives at what lies at the heart
of a Christian understanding of “theonomy.”3
1. Compare the pope’s argument with, among others: Christopher Lasch, The
Culture ofNarcissism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue
(Notre Dame, Inch: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981/1984); Robert Bellah et
A., Habits ofthe Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (New York: Harper
& Row, 1985); and more recently, William Schweiker, Responsibility and Christian Ethics
(New York: Cambridge, 1995).
2. See, e.g., the following “revisionist” responses to the pope: Charles E. Curran,
“Veritatis Splendor: A Revisionist Perspective,” in Veritatis Splendor: American Responses,
ed. Michael E. Allsopp and John J. O’Keefe (Kansas City: Sliced & Ward, 1995), pp.
224-43; Bernhard Haring, “A Distrust That Wounds,” in Considering "Veritatis Splen
dor,” ed. John Wilkins (Cleveland: Pilgrim, 1994), pp. 9-13; in that volume, sec also
Richard McCormick, “Killing the Patient,” pp. 14-20, and Josef Fuchs, “Good Acts
and Good Persons,” pp. 21-26.
3. See Paul Tillich’s definitions of “theonomy,” “autonomy,” and “heteronomy”
in Systematic Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1951), 1:83-86, 147-50; for a
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In my analysis of the encyclical, I propose that the pope is weaving
together two major conceptual patterns for defining freedom: one
rooted in traditional conceptions of natural law and magisterial au
thority, and the other rooted in the encounter of call and response,
dialogue, and communion between Christ and Christian believers.*4
My thesis is that the latter conception of freedom — which is ulti
mately rooted in Christ’s self-giving on the cross — is the more com
prehensive understanding of freedom in the encyclical and that it
offers an ongoing, reflexive witness against both a false autonomy and
a false heteronomy.
The pope’s definition of freedom cannot be isolated to a single
section or genre in the encyclical. Although the most explicit and
technical definition is found in the middle section, we cannot ignore
either his exegesis of Matthew 19 (in the first section) or his discus
sion of martyrdom (in the final section). My analysis, therefore,
begins with an interpretation of his exegesis of Matthew 19. This
exegesis enables us to identify the central question of this paper:
whether the pope collapses a theonomous into a heteronomous
conception of freedom by identifying Jesus’ absolute call to disciple
ship with the magisterial authority of the church. With that question
in mind, I turn to an analysis of the central themes in the notion of
freedom provided in the second part of the encyclical. I then compare
that definition, which focuses on freedom’s relationship to natural
law, with the other more personalist pattern for understanding free
dom — and its overarching context within the theme of Christian
martyrdom — found in the third part of the encyclical. On the basis
of this comparison, I conclude that the latter understanding of free
dom is more comprehensive and that it serves as an ongoing source
different but related definition of these three terms, see Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics,
The Doctrine ofthe Word of God, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1956). See also Robert
Scharlemann, “Autonomy,” in A New Plandbook of Christian Theology, eds. Donald W.
Musser and Joseph L. Price (Nashville: Abingdon, 1922), pp. 49-54.
4. For an analysis of an analogous contrast, see Janet E. Smith, “Natural Law
and Personalism in Veritatis Splendor,” in Veritatis Splendor: American Responses, ed.
Allsopp and O’Keefe, pp. 194-207. See also these primary sources on the pope’s
personalism: Karol Wojtyla, The Acting Person, trans. Andrej Potocki (Boston: D. Reidel, 1979); and Person and Community: Selected Essays, trans. Theresa Sandok (New
York: Peter Lang, 1993).
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and norm that empowers and corrects both autonomous and heteronomous forms of freedom.

I. An Exegetical Context
The pope’s proposal for a definition of freedom cannot be divorced
from the story of the rich young man in Matthew 19 since it is in his
exegesis of this story that he introduces his central assumptions regard
ing the meaning of true freedom. By situating his discussion of freedom
within the context of the dialogue between Jesus and the rich young
man, the pope situates it within the context of an “encounter” with
Christ and the “call from God who is the origin and goal of all human
life” (VS #6-7). This call to followjesus is “the essential and primordial
foundation of Christian morality” (VS #19). At the heart of Christian
ethics is the call to partake in Jesus’ life and destiny, to share his free and
loving obedience to the Father’s will, to “imitate” him along the path of
love: in other words, to be “conformed” to Christ. Jesus’ response to
the young man’s question — “What must I do?” — indicates that the
Christian moral life is not simply about rules but about the “full
meaning of life” — the “aspiration at the heart of every human decision,
the quiet searching and interior prompting which sets freedom in
motion” (VS #7). By starting with this story, the pope situates the moral
life within its theological and religious context; following Jesus touches
the “very depths” of one’s being. Jesus’ answers regarding what is good
and evil have to do with a “profound process” of appropriating and
assimilating the whole reality of the incarnation and redemption. In his
answer to the rich young man, Jesus brings the moral question —
“What must I do?” — back to its religious foundations, back to the
acknowledgment ofthe reality of God, that is, in his words, the “fullness
of life,” the “final end of human activity,” indeed, “perfect happiness.”
The moral life is understood to be a response to God’s gift and love for
human beings. Its fulfillment only comes as a gift from God, who offers
a share in the divine goodness revealed and communicated in Jesus. God
alone is Good; no human effort succeeds in “fulfilling” the law. The
“secret,” then, of the “educative power” in Christian morality, accord
ing to the pope, lies not in doctrinal assertions or appeals to moral
vigilance but rather in “constantly looking to Jesus.”
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Nonetheless, the law is not onlyfulfilled in Jesus Christ. It also has
a pedagogic function to help sinful humans become aware of their
powerlessness in the face of sin, to strip them of their presumption
of self-sufficiency, to lead them to ask for and receive the life in the
Spirit that can help them conquer sin. Further, this pedagogic function
is intrinsically linked not only with its fulfillment in Jesus Christ, as
we have already noted, but with its positive function as law. This
positive function is the explicit assertion of the two main command
ments within Christian faith, the commandments to love God and
the neighbor. Hence these commandments not only serve a pedagogic
function in helping us become aware of sin and they are not only
already fulfilled in Christ — who interiorizes their demands as the
living “fulfillment” of the law, fulfilling their authentic meaning,
giving grace to people to share in his life, and providing them with
the strength of their witness to that love in personal choices and action
— but they also simply serve the function of asserting what positively
needs to be done in order to be good and right. We have noted the
intrinsic connections the pope makes between the fulfillment of the
law in Jesus, its pedagogic function, and its positive function as law.
In turn, these positive commandments to love God and neighbor are
linked with both natural law and the divine law, both Old (as found in
the Decalogue) and Neiv (as, for example, in the Sermon on the
Mount or the summary found in Rom. 13:8-10). In doing this, the
pope makes it clear that Christian discipleship entails obedience to the
injunctions found in the Decalogue that safeguard persons and protect
their goods, specifically, its negative precepts that protect human life,
the communion of persons in marriage, private property, truthfulness,
and a person’s reputation. Finally, the pope adds yet another form of
law to this list. The disciple’s encounter with Christ is mediated over
time through the church, the “living tradition” of apostles, and this
living tradition has, like the early apostles, been “vigilant over the right
conduct of Christians” throughout its history.5
A number of observations can be made at this point. First, this
5. This analysis presumes the Reformers’ distinctions among the “uses of the law.”
See John Calvin, The Institutes ofthe Christian Religion, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Westminster,
1960); and Martin Luther, “On Temporal Authority,” in Martin Luther: Selectionsfrom His
Writings, ed. John Dillenberger (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961).
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move to situate Christian ethics within the context of the call of
discipleship, the “encounter” between Jesus and his disciples, has
strong parallels with the attempt by mid-century theologians to situate
theological ethics and theology within the context of an I-thou en
counter. We might observe that this exegetical context serves as a kind
of “fundamental ontology” for the pope’s ethics, situating his concep
tion within a particular frame of reference with regard to the ultimate
structure of the divine-human encounter.6 Instead of, say, the Neo
platonic scheme of exit and return that served as the frame for Thomas
Aquinas’s ethics, a dialogical or “personalist” frame serves as the
conceptual matrix for the pope’s moral theology. Further, by starting
with this encounter between Jesus and the rich young man, the pope
begins his moral theology with a profound sense of the intrinsic
connection between morality and religion. On the one hand, religion
is deeply moral; the love of God must be translated into the love of
neighbor, otherwise the attempt to speak on behalf of God can become
a form of heteronomous power that falsely absolutizes its own au
thority without correctives and checks. On the other hand, morality
is deeply religious. For the Christian, empowerment for the moral
life is found in Jesus Christ. Over and against a strictly autonomous
ethics, the Christian moral life is essentially a participation in the
divine life, the compelling “imitation” of Christ, the entering into the
life of God through Jesus.
With these observations, we arrive at what is distinctive about this
passage. Its central theme is that Christian morality finds its center
and criterion in the person of Jesus. The rich young man may keep
all the commandments, but he lacks one thing: a total commitment
to the person ofJesus Christ, a commitment that entails renunciation
of everything that keeps him from discipleship. This passage collapses
what can be identified as the difference between justification and
sanctification. On the one hand, it is about gift — the call to encounter
with Christ, who is the origin and goal of human life, the source and
saving power of Christian morality. On the other hand, it is also a call
6. On this, compare Andrew Tallon’s discussion of Emmanuel Levinas, Karl
Rahner, and Bernard Lonergan as resources for analyzing the pope’s fundamental
ontology, “The Role of the Connaturalized Heart in Veritatis Splendor,” in Veritatis
Splendor: American Responses, ed. Allsopp and O’Keefe, pp. 137-56.
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to obedience, a command to live life in a certain way. If it offers a
vision of life that inspires and empowers — that responds in a pro
found way to the aspirations of the human heart — then it also pre
sents a mandate and an imperative.
So far we have outlined a fairly standard reading of this passage.
But the pope offers an additional twist. If the usual reading — and
one could argue, the passage itself— collapses gift and command in
the call to discipleship, then the pope collapses two further distinctions
in his reading of the passage: the absolute and unconditioned call of
discipleship with the moral teaching of the church. He equates Jesus’
call, the primordial foundation of Christian morality, with the “living
tradition” of the church and its interpretation ofJesus’ commands and
teachings. We arrive, then, at a central tension at the heart of the pope’s
interpretation of this passage: Is Jesus’ ultimate and unconditioned
call to discipleship to be equated with the church’s judgments about
how best to “put into practice” Jesus’ commandments and teaching
in specific historical and cultural contexts (VS #25)? If so, why? If
not, then how is Jesus’ call to be related to the church’s teaching?
This question is a complex one. From a subjective standpoint, it
grapples with the question of how the moral agent’s response to Jesus’
call is related to concrete moral judgments and acts. From an objective
standpoint, it grapples with how the very absoluteness of moral norms
is related to concrete judgments made in particular circumstances. We
address these questions in the rest of the essay, but before we do so,
we need to outline the more technical definition of freedom that the
pope proposes in the second section of the encyclical.

II. A Natural Law Understanding of Freedom
After his exegesis of Matthew 19, the pope presents a comprehensive
definition of freedom in the middle section of the encyclical. Not
only docs he propose a rich and subtle definition of freedom, but
precisely because of its comprehensiveness, this definition can also
serve as a kind of miniproposal for an ethics that has theonomous
freedom as its first principle or root conceptual pattern. In examining
this definition, my task will not be to analyze the accuracy of the
pope’s reading of existing “autonomous” positions — the positions
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he argues against in presenting his own constructive proposal. Rather,
I focus specifically on the content of the pope’s critique and his
constructive position.
The pope’s definition of freedom in this section has three dimen
sions.7 The first dimension, which essentially deals with the nature
and locus of the good, is entitled “freedom and law.” The question
the pope addresses in this dimension is the fundamental question of
whether the ultimate “good” of freedom is to act as one wishes for
one’s own individual good (as one defines that good), or whether it
is to will and act in conformity with the moral laws that inhere in
human nature. The second dimension, entitled “conscience and
truth,” discusses how the agent — through the guidance of conscience
— arrives at the norms that are to govern actions. The question here
is whether conscience ultimately forms “decisions” of the individual’s
will or “judgments” that enact general laws in particular instances.
The last dimension — which focuses on the practical question of who
one should be and what one should do in specific circumstances —
deals with the relationship between one’s “fundamental option” and
specific moral acts. The question here is whether an agent’s moral
identity is defined primarily by existential acts that shape the whole
course of his or her life (what has been called in Roman Catholic
moral theology “fundamental option”), or by judgments and actions
regarding the object of particular acts, such as the fact that certain acts
are “intrinsically evil.”
I begin with the pope’s discussion of “freedom and truth.” In this
discussion of freedom’s ultimate good, the pope asserts the thesis of
the encyclical: that freedom divorced from the fundamental truth of
reality is not true freedom but arbitrary choice. He identifies a freedom
divorced from truth with an “autonomous” conception of freedom
that severs human freedom — the human capacity to choose and
decide — from some understanding of “nature” — the inherent value
of human and natural reality. He is especially critical of two forms of
such an autonomous freedom, both of which locate morality solely

7. Note how these three dimensions mirror the distinctions in ethics among
(1) the nature and locus of the good; (2) criteria for judgment and action; and (3) the
character of the moral self On this see Janies Gustafson’s first chapter in Christ ami
the Moral Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).
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in the rationality and will of the moral agent: (1) a consequentialist
ethics that presupposes a separation of “fact” from “value” and treats
all moral phenomena — except the will’s actual capacity for choice —
as empirical phenomena to be studied by means of scientific methods;
and (2) a rights-based ethics that treats all other dimensions of human
and natural experience — for example, the material and biological —
outside of human creativity as raw material for human agency and
power. Both approaches to morality, the pope argues, lead to some
form of relativism because they allow no other substance to determine
the will’s choices beyond its own preferences.
In lieu of such an autonomous ethics, the pope argues for a
“participated theonomy” in which human reason and will are oriented
not toward their own predilections but participation in divine wisdom
and providence.8 Of course he does not negate the reality of human
reason and will; he even affirms that God has given human beings
“dominion” in the world. By means of their intelligence and will,
human beings do have some capacity to discover the values and laws
of created things and decide best how to use or appropriate them.
This capacity enables them not only to perform moral acts but to
shape a moral identity and therefore strive for moral perfection. What
the pope wants to stress, however, is that such autonomy does not
create its own values and norms. Rather, these values and norms are
contingent on divine wisdom and providence — what could also be
called divine law. In the pope’s view, such an approach to morality is
not simply a heteronomy, in which the reason and will blindly follow
a strange law wholly external to them, but a theonomy — or more
specifically a “participated theonomy” — in which human beings, by
8. Compare the pope’s distinction between (1) autonomous freedom and
(2) theonomous freedom with Mortimer Adler’s distinction between, on the one
hand, (1) the acquired freedom of self-perfection and, on the other hand, (2) the
circumstantial freedom of self-realization and (3) the natural freedom of self-deter
mination in The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical Examination of the Conceptions of Freedom,
vols. 1 and 2 (New York: Doubleday, 1958 and 1961). For an analogous framework,
see Richard McKeon’s essay on “Freedom and History” in Freedom and History and
Other Essays, ed. Zahava McKeon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp.
160-241. See also the discussion of freedom, from a sociological perspective, in
Orlando Patterson’s Freedom in the Making of Western Culture, vol. 1 (New York: Basic
Books, 1991).
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the lights of natural reason and divine revelation, participate in their
own finite way in the wisdom and providence of divine law, the divine
pattern or exemplar that governs the ordering of existence.
Given this contrast between an “autonomous ethics” and a “par
ticipated theonomy,” we turn to the second dimension in the pope’s
definition of freedom: his discussion of “conscience and truth,” how
he understands conscience to discern and enact the values and norms
that inhere in created reality. In line with his rejection of an autono
mous view of freedom’s good, the pope rejects a view of conscience
that emphasizes its creative character, that is, its capacity to make
“decisions” as opposed to “judgments.” Such an approach emphasizes
concrete existential considerations rather than the application of
general norms articulated at a doctrinal or abstract level. The pope
rejects such a view because it stresses not the objectivity of moral
norms but the “creative and responsible acceptance of personal tasks
entrusted to one by God.” Such a position tends to minimize the
importance of objective norms for moral behavior, understanding
these fnerely to be “general perspectives” that assist one in forming
personal decisions.
What the pope offers instead is a view of conscience that highlights
the way its “judgments” apply the natural law to specific circum
stances, for example, the first principle of practical reason, that one
must do good and avoid evil. In this, conscience is a “witness” to
whether human beings are faithful or unfaithful to the law. Con
science, therefore, entails primarily a dialogue with God, the author
of the law “whose voice and judgment penetrate the depth of the
human soul” (VS #58). In serving as this witness, conscience
manifests “conflicting thoughts” that either accuse or excuse a person.
And since one’s conscience can make faulty judgments, the pope calls
Christians to have their consciences formed — to make them “the
object of a continual conversion to what is true and to what is good”
(VS #64). Such a task entails not merely having a general knowledge
of God’s law but having a kind of “connaturality” with the true good,
a “connaturality” developed through the cultivation of the virtues,
both cardinal (prudence, justice, temperance, and courage) and theo
logical (faith, hope, and love). The function of the church’s magis
terium is precisely to assist Christians in the formation of such a
conscience.
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We have so far depicted the pope’s conception of the good, which
freedom is to enact, and how one’s conscience discerns and applies
that good — or that “law” — in specific circumstances. We turn now
to the third dimension of his definition of freedom: how he defines
the character of the moral self, the way an agent defines her identity
over time by specific actions and judgments. The central issue the
pope grapples with in this discussion is the relationship between a
person’s “fundamental option” and the specific choices she makes in
concrete circumstances. At the outset, we should be clear that the pope
does not wholly reject the concept of the fundamental option. Fie has
a place in his ethics for a “fundamental option”: those decisions which
determine the course or direction of one’s life, whether, say, one
defines one’s life as being for or against the Good and Truth. Indeed,
he notes that the concept has deep biblical roots as the “obedience of
faith,” the act of “faith working through love,” what forms the “core”
of a person’s “heart,” the radical and unconditional decision de
manded by the kingdom of God (Matt. 19:21).
What he criticizes in his treatment of the fundamental option is
any disjunction of the way one’s character or agency is shaped and the
actual moral acts one performs. Freedom, he contends, becomes
“slavery” when an act of faith — an act that shapes one’s fundamental
option — is separated from the specific moral acts one performs.
Hence he criticizes the strict identification of one’s fundamental op
tion with what Karl Rahner would call the “transcendental” or “prethematic,” an identification that would separate a “deeper” and “dif
ferent” decision from the other more specific and “categorical”
decisions one makes throughout the course of one’s life.9 He is also
critical of any attempt to define these categorical acts merely as partial
signs and symbols which never give one’s fundamental option full
definitive expression.
The pope’s chief difficulty is with the development of two levels
of morality, one centered on how the moral “good” and “evil” is
dependent on the will and the other centered on ascriptions of “right”
9. Oil Karl Rainier’s definition of the “fundamental option,” see Karl Rahner,
“Theology of Freedom,” in Theological Investigations (London: Darton, Longman and
Todd, 1969), 6:178-96; sec also his Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the
Idea of Christianity, trans. William Dycli (New York: Seabury, 1978).
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and “wrong” based on a “calculation” of the “premoral” and “physi
cal” goods and evils that result from that action. The reason the pope
is critical of any separation of these levels is that it diminishes the
sense to which moral acts do have an “object,” an object that has a
“teleological” character essentially linked with humanity’s final ends.
The pope is critical of any disjunctions of two types ofvalues: (1) those
pertaining to the moral order, that is, properly “moral” values such
as the love of God and neighbor and justice; and (2) those pertaining
to the “premoral” order such as the mental, emotional, or physical
advantages or disadvantages that can accrue to the self and others in
specific actions (e.g., with regard to life, death, physical integrity, or
the loss of material goods).
In sum, in this section, I have traced the pope’s contrast between
a “theonomous” and “autonomous” conception of freedom. The
pope’s theonomous position is a corrective to a autonomous ethics
that solely identifies ethical judgments with decisions of the will. But
is his position actually theonomous (in that it truly maintains a place
for human freedom in relation to God) or is it finally heteronomous
(based solely on obedience to a “strange” — heteros — “law” —
nomas') ? This leads us to ask what role the individual plays in the pope’s
work. The pope himself speaks of the importance of the fundamental
option, but how is this option — this decision to creatively define
one’s life — related to the objectivity of laws that are to define one’s
actions? What role does a person’s unique individuality play in the
pope’s definition of freedom? We return, then, to the questions raised
at the end of our exegetical section: How is the gift and command of
Jesus’ call related to the shaping of the individual self? And, if the
overarching shape of one’s life is linked with specific norms and
mandates, then wherein lies the absoluteness of those norms, which
shape the self? I address these questions by examining yet another
definition of freedom offered in the encyclical.

III. A Personalist Understanding of Freedom
In the previous section I examined one of the definitions of freedom
in the encyclical — what we can call a traditional “natural law” view
that locates freedom’s end in a moral law or ideal befitting human
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nature.10 11
I traced how the pope contrasts this definition with an
“autonomous” view that locates its end within the agent herself, in
her decisions about what she should be and do. The pope argues that
the former definition is superior to the latter because it establishes
criteria external to the self for determining how the self’s freedom
should be used. The autonomous view, by contrast, locates the norm
forjudging freedom within the agent’s own capacity to exercise free
dom of choice — for example, her own self-legislation (as in forms
of Kantian ethics) and capacity to choose among possible good out
comes (as in forms of consequentialist ethics), or, on a popular level,
in terms of such criteria as “sincerity, authenticity and ‘being at peace
with oneself’” (VS #32). Such individualistic forms of grounding
moral norms do not, according to the pope, provide a strong enough
basis for preserving the very freedom valued in democracies — for
criticizing, for example, social and economic injustice, political cor
ruption, and the violation of human rights, or for providing the kind
of “radical personal and social renewal” needed to ensure “solidarity,
honesty, and openness” (VS #98). The reason: they locate the norm
for evaluating the human use of power (human freedom) in the actual
use of that power — in the capacity to make choices and decisions.
The danger in making the exercise of freedom the sole value to be
preserved is this: value is not perceived to inhere in reality itself (e.g.,
in the intrinsic value of human beings) but in the capacity to exercise
freedom (the use of power). But, if power is the only value, then what
value or norm is to judge the use of power other than the very use of
that power? Given this problematic, the pope attempts to ground the
human good in an understanding of the “True” and the “Good” —
beyond simply the exercise of power — because, in his view, only such
a conception of truth and goodness external to the self can overcome
“the various forms of totalitarianism” and “make way for the authentic
freedom of the person” (VS #99, my emphasis).
And yet there is a difficulty with the pope’s “natural law” view of
freedom: it focuses on what human beings share — their knowledge
of the law, the “True” and the “Good” — and not on what makes
them unique and individual." Such an approach meets the requirement
10. Compare Smith, “Natural Law and Personalism in Veritatis Splendor.”
11. My argument here is influenced by William Schweiker, “Power arid the
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of providing a norm external to the self for evaluating the self’s
exercise of power. Nonetheless, the pope also stresses that it is pre
cisely one’s “obedience to universal and unchanging moral norms”
that leads one to “respect the uniqueness and individuality of the person”
(VS #85, my emphasis). But: Why ought an individual’s uniqueness
to be valued when any real, actual individual is always less than
perfect? What is it that confers value on the individual, who is always
contingent and imperfect?12 Does the self, in all its individuality, need
to be effaced in order for the individual to be morally good and true?
Even in his depiction of the “natural law” view of freedom, the pope
has a place for a strong sense of individuality and the human capacity
to define and shape one’s character and identity creatively. Even in
that context, he makes reference to a person’s “heart,” which, in turn,
is defined in terms of one’s “fundamental choice which qualifies the
moral life and engages freedom on a radical level before God.” Such
“fundamental choices” are the “decisions of faith” described in the
Elebrew and Christian Scriptures — for example, in Israel’s capacity
to make covenants with God (cf Josh. 24:14-25; Exod. 19:3-8; Mic.
6:8), the Christian’s response to the call to discipleship and perfection
(Matt. 19:21), and the radical and unconditional nature of the decision
demanded by the reign of God (VS #66). But how is this conception
of individuality — and one’s capacity to change one’s character cre
atively by deciding what one shall do or become — related to the focus
on conformity to the “good” and “true,” the moral law or ideal

Agency of God,” Theology Today 52 (July 1995): 204-24. See also his comparison of
Christian and Platonic approaches to ethics in “The Sovereignty of God’s Goodness,”
in Iris Murdoch and the Search for Human Goodness, ed. Maria Antonaccio and William
Schwciker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 209-36. For a fuller
development of his position, see his Responsibility and Christian Ethics,
12. Compare Risto Saarinen’s observation that the pope’s concept of nature tends
toward an Averroist conception of the unity of the human intellect. See his essay in
this volume. As Saarinen notes, commentators have pointed out that VS #46-50
follows Martin Rhonheimer’s analysis of nature in Naturals Gmudlage der Moral: Eiue
Auseinaudersetziing mit autonomer mid teleologischer Ethik (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1987). See,
e.g., W. Schopsdau, “Rekonfessionalisierung der Moral? Beobachtungcii aus evangelischer Sicht zur nachkonziliarcn Entwicklung und zur Enzyklika Eeritatis Splendor,”
in Abschottung start Dialog? Das Lehramt der Kirche und die Moral, ed. S. Pfurtncr et al.
(Luzern: Exodus, 1994), pp. 149-70, see esp. pp. 163-64.
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befitting human nature, so stressed in the pope’s “natural law” view
of freedom?
To address this question, I turn to a somewhat different pattern
for understanding freedom in the third section of the encyclical, what
we will call the pope’s “personalist” conception of freedom. This other
pattern is defined primarily in terms of the Christian’s response to
Christ’s call to discipleship, even to the point of martyrdom. In my
exegesis of this personalist pattern, I deal with how it depicts the
relationship between (1) God as the source of the absolute moral claim
on human life — as the “crucified Christ” — and (2) the moral agent
who stands in relation to God — as the disciple who responds to God’s
call.
There is an eloquent passage at the beginning of the third part of the
encyclical that depicts the pope’s personalist conception of freedom. It
begins with the observation that “rational reflection and daily experi
ence” demonstrate both the “weakness” and the “tragedy” of human
freedom. The weakness of human freedom lies in the fact that it is “real”
but “limited.” This weakness is demonstrated in three ways. First, it is
demonstrated in the fact that human freedom has a truly “absolute and
unconditional origin.” Although human freedom is — like its origin —
absolute and unconditional, this freedom itself originates from a reality
other than itself; hence, it always finds itself situated within reality. For
this reason, freedom always belongs to human beings as a gift. Humans
arc creatures who receive their freedom as a given, a gift. This is what it
means to have a “creaturely image.” And it is this creaturely image that
constitutes “the basis of the dignity of the person.” Second, this freedom
is at once an “inalienable self-possession,” on the one hand, and an
“openness to all that exists,” on the other. Further, this openness is
defined more specifically in personal terms as the “passing beyond self
to knowledge and love of the other.” What this means is that true
freedom is not merely oriented towards one’s self in self-possession but
is “ultimately directed toward communion.” This freedom “is an echo
of the primordial vocation” whereby “the Creator calls human beings
to the true Good,” and further, “through Christ’s revelation, to become
God’s friend and to share his own divine life.” Finally, although this
freedom is a given, it is “received like a seed” that must be a “cultivated
responsibility.” And this leads us to the tragic dimension of freedom: that
human beings face the constant temptation to sin. In a “mysterious
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way,” the pope observes, we are “inclined to betray our openness to the
True and the Good” and instead “choose finite, limited, and ephemeral
goods.” Such betrayal can take a variety of forms: for example, setting
one’s self or some other person or thing up as an absolute principle or,
we might add, negating or denying the inviolable worth of created
reality. Hence, there is a continual need for the ongoing conversion,
imitation, and perfection of a life, the “contemplation of” and “com
munion with” Jesus so as to reorient one’s inclinations so that they
“conform” to Jesus’ own pattern of self-giving (VS #86).
This depiction of freedom is expressed in more personalist lan
guage: it makes reference to freedom as part of the “inherent dignity”
of the person, to its “openness to all that exists” and finding its
culmination in “communion” and the “knowledge and love of the
other” (VS #86). It is also deeply Augustinian in its focus on the
tragedy of the freedom being its substitution of finite goods for the
ultimate good (VS #86). We can identify two main themes in this
definition of freedom. If it stresses the individual’s “inalienable selfpossession,” then the goal of this self-possession is to pass “beyond
self to knowledge and love of the other.” Hence, stress is placed on
both (1) the uniqueness of human persons and their irreducible moral
worth, on the one hand, and (2) the source and goal of that unique
ness, on the other — communion with God and others. These two
norms or values — the inherent dignity of individuals and their orien
tation toward communion — are depicted as absolute and uncondi
tional, that is, linked with an “openness to all that exists.” Indeed, the
tragedy of sin is precisely the human failure to recognize the weakness
of that freedom, which is always both “real but limited,” the fact that
its source and goal is rooted not in itself, or in finite, ephemeral goods,
but in God, the True and the Good.
This personalist conception of freedom is situated within the
broader context of a meditation on Christian martyrdom. Such
martyrdom is rooted neither in human heroism nor the constancy of
good intentions, but in the crucified Christ. We might say that the
crucified Christ is the nature and locus of the good of this personalist
conception of freedom.13 The pope situates this conception of martyr
dom in relation to the apostle Paul’s understanding of his mission:
13. Compare James Gustafson, Christ and the Moral Life.
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Christ. . . sent me ... to preach the Gospel, and not with eloquent
wisdom, lest the cross of Christ be emptied of its power. . . . We
preach Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and folly to Gen
tiles, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the
power of God and the loisdom of God (1 Cor. 1:17, 23-24)44

The source and norm of freedom in this personalist view is the
crucified Christ who reveals the authentic meaning and truth of free
dom by living it fully in the total gift of himself and calling his disciples
to share in this freedom as self-giving (VS #88). In the pope’s words,
Jesus is the “living personal summation of perfect freedom in total
obedience to the will of God.” His “crucified flesh reveals the un
breakable bond between freedom and truth”; in turn, “his resurrec
tion from the dead is the supreme exaltation of the fruitfulness and
saving power of a freedom lived in truth” (VS #87).
What is the significance of having the crucified and risen Christ
as source of the absolute moral claim on human life? We might ask
the same question of the other ways of thinking and speaking of God
and God’s relationship to human beings that we find in Veritatis Splen
dor, ways that stress the sense to which God is a personal God (for
example, as Creator and Redeemer, as the one who made covenants
with Israel, as one who calls believers to discipleship, or in relation to
the reign of God). What we find in these ways of speaking about God,
and especially in the testimony to the self-giving Christ, is not merely
a depiction of an impersonal Good unconcerned with the fate of
individuals — a Good that does not respond to or recognize what is
other than itself—but a God who has through Christ given God’s
very self for human beings. Christians believe that God has not only
endowed creatures with value but has, through Christ, shared our
humanity in order to overcome sin, pain, death, and even demonic
powers. The significance, then, of Christian belief in a personal God
lies precisely in the affirmation that God, as ultimate power, has bound
God’s very identity to the worth of created reality, not only by en
dowing it with inviolable worth but by giving of Christ’s very self on
the cross. There is yet a further point about this Christian naming of

14. Note how the words “power” and “wisdom” are redefined by the “folly”

of the cross.
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God: that this very act of divine power — of Christ’s self-giving for
humanity — actually defines what God’s nature, God’s character, is
for us.15 What classical christological and trinitarian belief affirms is
that Christians know who God is — what God’s character is like —
based on how God has acted in creation and redemption, in the work
of the Father, Son, and Spirit. What is affirmed in this Christian
naming of God is that although God is the sole origin of power in
the world, God is not simply an absolute power. Christians, for ex
ample, affirm that God is that reality who (as “Creator”) endows
created reality with value, and (as “love”) gives of Christ’s very self
to finite existence. In these affirmations, both creation and love are
instances of power in which power generates value or bestows value
on another. But in such acts of bestowal, power alone does not define
value. Rather, what defines value is the very act of bestowing value.
Hence Christian moral theology is not based on a strictly empirical
account of reality or one based solely on human creativity and freedom
— or even a conception of an absolute and impersonal Good or Power.
Rather, what undergirds Christian morality is this very divine trans
formation of power whereby ultimate power binds itself to the creation
and redemption of finite existence.16
We turn to the anthropological corollary to this christological
grounding of ethics. In the same way that Jesus’ act of self-giving for
his brothers and sisters on the cross constitutes his identity as the
crucified and risen Christ, so the faith — the contemplation and com
munion — that responds to this gift “gives rise to and calls for a
consistent life commitment.” There is, then, an intrinsic relationship
between faith and morality in this personalist conception of freedom:
the “worship of God” and “contemplation of Jesus Crucified” is the
“never-ending source” from which the church draws to live in free
dom and love and service. Jesus’ self-giving is the “source, model, and
means” for the witness — the “confession” — of his disciples. If

15. This is the core insight for identifying a relationship between the economic
Trinity and the immanent Trinity. See the classic statements on this in Karl Barth,
Church Dogmatics, vol. 1, The Doctrine of the Word of God (Edinburgh: T & T Clark,
1956), and Karl Rahner, The Trinity (New York: Seabury, 1974).
16. On this discussion of the identity of God, compare Schweiker, “Power and
the Agency of God,” esp. pp. 207-8, and Responsibility and Christian Ethics.
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Christ’s identity is defined by the act of self-giving, then, his very gift
of self is the “grace” and “responsibility” that enables human beings
to do as he did. In their “trusting abandonment to Christ,” Christian
disciples are bound to the “profound love of God and our brothers
and sisters” (VS #87-89).
But if charity is the believer’s supreme “witness” or testimony,
this charity contains justice in itself as its unconditional element.17 In
the pope’s words: “Faith also possesses a moral content” (VS #89).
If love is the ultimate truth that defines the Christian life, then its
very quality as charity (caritas, agape) entails that justice — the recog
nition of the irreducible worth and dignity of each human person —
is not violated. As I noted in my introduction to this personalist
definition of freedom: the very act of (1) “passing beyond self to
knowledge and love of the other” entails that one also (2) respect the
uniqueness and irreducible worth of the other person — and, I might
add, one’s self— even in the attempt to share one’s self with that
other.18 Charity requires that one give unconditioned respect to the
personal dignity of each person as its condition. And such respect does
not merely entail a “thin” abstract theory of the human good. Rather,
it entails a concrete witness to the particular goods that constitute the
inviolable dignity of humans — goods that entail the prohibition of
certain acts as “intrinsically evil” (as found, for example, in the Ten
Commandments). It is within this context of speaking about the
Christian witness to the inviolability of human worth that the pope
speaks of martyrdom — of giving of one’s self in the act of witnessing
to the moral order, that is, the inherent goodness and evil of particular
acts (VS #90-94). In the same way that Christ has bound his existence
to the inviolable worth of humanity, so we are to bind our existence,
17. Compare Paul Tillich, Morality and Beyond (Louisville: Westminster, 1995),
pp. 38-39.
18. A theme that would need to be examined more closely is the relationship
between self and other with regard to this conception of radical self-giving. This
theme is especially salient in the feminist criticisms of Veritatis Splendor. See, e.g.,
Kathleen Talvacchia and Mary Elizabeth Walsh, “The Splendor ofTruth: A Feminist
Critique,” in Veritatis Splendor: American Responses, ed. Allsopp and O’Keefe, pp. 296310. For a discussion of the central theological issues at stake in this issue, see Kathryn
Tanner, The Politics of God: Christian Theologies and SocialJustice (Minneapolis: Fortress,
1992).
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even to the point of death, to give witness to the inviolable worth of
others.
What I have offered in this section is a reading of the pope’s
personalist understanding of freedom. This section has, in a nutshell,
been an exegesis of his claim that “the Supreme Good and the moral
good meet in truth — the truth of God, as creator and redeemer, is
also the truth of humans who are created and redeemed by God” (VS
#99). The foundation for the Christian morality in this personalist
view is neither an abstract and impersonal good nor an absolute
conception of power, but Jesus’ self-giving for his fellow human
beings. This self-giving, in turn, is the pattern human beings are
empowered to follow — the “grace” and “responsibility” of Christian
discipleship (VS #87). As Christ’s identity — Christ’s exercise of free
dom and power — is constituted by self-giving, so the way of disciple
ship is constituted by obedience to the radical and unconditioned
command of the gospel, in the pope’s words, the constant “confor
mity” or “imitation” of the pattern of Christ’s life (VS #89). Such
truth is an ongoing corrective to both a false autonomy that would
set individual freedom up as an absolute and, I might note, it also
serves as a corrective to a false heteronomy that would establish a false
social unity as an absolute — a “communion” that did not recognize
the inviolable worth of individuals. Why? Because it asserts that the
primordial ground of Christian morality is not power itself as an
absolute but the divine power that has bound its very identity to the
creation and redemption of finite life. Hence any act of human free
dom that “echoes” this “primordial vocation” must itself be an act
that reflexively witnesses to the irreducible worth and inviolable dig
nity of human beings (as creatures), even as it gives of itself to others
in charity (in love) (cf. VS #86).

IV. A Concluding Comparison
In the section on the pope’s exegesis of Matthew 19,1 asked whether
a tension could be discerned between the unconditional demand of
the gospel, on the one hand, and the specific teachings of natural law
and the church, on the other. I ask an analogous question in this
section. Is there a tension between the two definitions of freedom we
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have outlined? The one stresses our communion between God and
human beings, a communion which presupposes the inviolable dig
nity and worth of each individual. The other stresses the need for
obedience to an immutable and universal natural law, a law that is also
commensurate with the church’s magisterial teaching; it emphasizes
the way human rationality and will can discover and enact the norms
and values that inhere in creation. Are these two conceptions of free
dom distinct or are they the same? What is the relationship between
them? My task in this final section will be to discuss the implications
of the pope’s personalist conception of freedom for these two issues:
(1) how the moral agent is related to concrete moral judgments and
acts and (2) how the very absoluteness of moral norms is related to
conscience and the concrete judgments made in particular circum
stances. I conclude with related reflections on the role of an “auton
omous” ethics in moral theology.
I begin with the question of how the moral agent is related to
concrete moral judgments and acts. I have noted that the pope is critical
of a tendency he perceives in some modern Catholic moral theology to
draw too sharp a distinction between a deeper “transcendental” or
“prethematic” self that makes “moral” decisions regarding good and evil
(which deal with more abstract ethical notions like justice and love) and
the actions one actually performs with regard to “premoral” goods
regarding, say, the mental, emotional, or physical advantages or dis
advantages that can accrue to the self and others in specific actions
(which deal with the concrete objects of specific moral acts). But he also
presents a rich understanding of the concept of “heart” in the encyclical:
that it has to do precisely with the “conversion” and “perfection” of
one’s life, one’s loves and actions, by “conforming” oneself to the
“pattern” of Christ. Indeed, at the heart of the pope’s personalist view
of freedom is the intrinsic link drawn between Christ’s crucified and
risen flesh and the way of Christian discipleship. It locates freedom’s
end not simply in (1) the will’s decisions nor (2) a moral law or ideal
befitting human nature but in (3) an act offaith, what he calls the “heart”
of a human, the fundamental decisions and choices that define her
identity and character over time. This act of faith presupposes a funda
mental correlation between who Christ is and who we are — that we
are to contemplate and imitate Christ so that we can enter into his act
of self-giving for others. Hence, although the pope is critical of an
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approach to ethics that would sever one’s fundamental option from
specific behaviors, he does not reject the concept of fundamental option.
Indeed, the very call of Christian discipleship requires a decision about
the totality of one’s life. But if this decision is not solely defined in terms
of the “autonomous” will’s decisions abstracted from concrete goods,
then it is also not solely defined in terms of discrete or isolated acts of
obedience to an external “heteronomous” law. Rather, it is the ongoing
perfection and conversion of a life, a perfection that takes place in the
actual judgments and actions that enact concrete goods or evils, goods
or evils that either witness to or negate the inviolable worth of human
dignity.
Now, it is precisely at this point that we are led to the role of
conscience and the question of what constitutes the absoluteness of
moral norms.19 In the pope’s personalist conception of freedom, his
emphasis is not simply on how conscience perceives an immutable and
universal law. Rather, what conscience perceives are the concrete goods
— and evils — that either respect and enhance or violate a person’s
worth. These goods, and their implication that some acts are intrinsically
evil, are precisely what is protected by the Ten Commandments or the
church’s moral teaching. But, if the authorization of these teachings
does not simply lie in one’s own individual “authentic” resonance with
them, then it also does not simply lie in inherited moral convictions.
Rather, their authorization lies in the irreducible worth of the particular
goods themselves.20 It is to this inviolable dignity that conscience gives
19. See the classic essay by Josef Fuchs, “The Absoluteness of Behavioral Moral
Norms,” in Personal Responsibility and Christian Morality (Washington, D.C.: George
town University Press, 1983), pp. 115-52.
20. Compare Jean Porter’s observation: “The implication of affirming the inde
pendent significance of the object of an action, for Aquinas, is that moral judgment
must be carried out in terms of the meanings of the basic moral concepts, such as
murder and legitimate execution, for example, which form the framework for moral
judgment and discourse for the whole society. Our understanding of these basic
notions can be refined, and wc can and do change our minds, individually and
collectively, about the moral quality of some kinds of actions. Yet we cannot ‘get
behind’ the basic moral concepts to some simpler and more fundamental units of
moral analysis. The wisdom and commitments to the good that are embodied in these
basic notions set the fundamental terms for moral judgment, whether that wisdom
and those commitments are seen as coming from the human community and natural
reason alone, or we trace them ultimately, as Aquinas himselfwould do, to the wisdom
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witness; it is precisely this irreducibility that serves as an ongoing —
and, one might add, reflexive — check on both individual and corporate
uses of power. Thus, even though Veritatis Splendor stresses the magiste
rial authority of church teaching and in places absolutizes this teaching
by stressing its immutability and universality, its own witness to the
irreducibility of human worth articulates a reflexive norm that provides
an ongoing test and correction of the very articulations of any such
norm. What conscience perceives is a standard that tests not only one’s
own proclivities and preferences but the cultural forms which mediate
a community’s — including the Christian community’s — norms and
values. Although this standard is immutable and universal, its immuta
bility and universality lie not in an impersonal principle nor a particular
cultural articulation of that standard, but in the very inviolable worth of
creaturely reality, a worth grounded in God’s own personal creative and
redemptive activity.
Of course, individuals and communities need each other in the
formation of conscience. On the one hand, the “living tradition” has
a role to play in the shaping of the individual’s conscience. On the
other hand, however, an individual may be led by conscience to
question ecclesial and cultural authorities. Thus, before the emperor
in Worms, Martin Luther insisted that it was not right to do something
against the conscience; and even Thomas Aquinas stated that he would
disobey the command of a superior to whom he had made a vow of
obedience if this superior asked something against his conscience.21
and love of God” (“The Moral Act in Veritatis Splendor and in Aquinas’s Stitnma
Theologiac: A Comparative Analysis,” in Veritatis Splendor: American Responses, ed. All
sopp and O’Keefe, p. 293; see also “Moral Reasoning, Authority, and Community in
Veritatis Splendor,” The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics [ 1995]: 201-19). See a
fuller development of her position in Jean Porter, Moral Action and Christian Ethics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
21. See how Paul Tillich distinguishes the Reformation’s conception of theo
logical freedom front the Enlightenment’s notion of freedom of conscience: “The
quest for ‘freedom of conscience’ does not refer to the concrete ethical decision, but
to the religious authority of the inward light that expresses itself through the individual
conscience. And since the inward light could hardly be distinguished from practical
reason, freedom of conscience meant, actually, the freedom to follow one’s autono
mous reason, not only in ethics, but also in religion. The ‘religion of conscience’ and
the consequent idea of tolerance arc not a result of the Reformation, but of sectarian
spiritualism and mysticism” (Morality and Beyond, p. 73).
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The pope’s very intent of providing a witness that can ward off in
both “civil society and within the ecclesial communities themselves a head
long plunge into . . . the confusion between good and evil” entails
that the unconditional and irreducible nature of these goods in them
selves be maintained precisely so that they can serve as an ongoing and
reflexive test and corrective to the existing values of those very civil
societies and ecclesial communities (VS #93, my emphasis).
These reflections on conscience, in turn, lead us to the role of an
autonomous ethics. The pope articulates an important critique of an
autonomous ethic that would sever the link between freedom and
nature, locating good and evil solely in the decision-making power of
individuals, and thereby separating “valuing” decision-makers from the
“facts” of reality. His very attempt to situate morality within the broader
context of faith is an attempt to overcome the secularization of created
reality, both human and nonhuman. This is an important point: the eyes
of faith affirm the teleological character of such created reality, since they
see all as finally participating in the divine life. Nonetheless, this point
need not negate the recognition that all human beings, and not only
Christians, have a capacity to learn morally. In fact, the pope himself
refers to the fact that in their witness to the absoluteness of the moral
good, Christians are not alone but “are supported by the moral sense
present in peoples and by the great religious and sapiential traditions of
East and West, from which the interior and mysterious workings of
God’s Spirit are not absent” (VS #94).
It also need not negate the importance of being attentive to the
actual empirical and prudential goods — physical, psychological, so
cial, and spiritual — that define human existence (cf. VS #112).
Indeed, these premoral goods, in all their empirical richness, are pre
cisely the values to be transformed by the conscience’s insight into
their unconditioned worth or “teleological character.” The very con
dition of communion is the recognition of the inviolable worth of
created reality. The Christian norm of agape presupposes these goods
as its unconditioned element. The theological task is precisely to
perfect and enhance these goods. It is possible, then, to have a place
in an ethics for the empirical and prudential study of human goods,
without negating their teleological character. Strong theological prec
edent can be found for this not only in Aquinas’s differentiated con
cept of reason (in the distinctions between nature and grace, reason
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and revelation) but in the Augustinian transformation of the natural
virtues or the spheres in the earthly cities in terms of the norm of
love.
We return, then, to the question raised throughout the paper. Is
the pope’s proposal for freedom heteronomous or theonomous? We
have addressed this question by focusing on the fundamental link he
draws between faith and morality. Ostensively, this encyclical was
Written in order to bolster the magisterium’s power. But there is a
deeper theological goal that informs this encyclical: the goal of ful
filling the church’s mission to speak out against injustice and affirm
with other human beings and the other great religions the inviolability
of human worth. The pope’s argument is that the modern constriction
of morality to the rights and freedoms of individuals undercuts the
very bases for protecting those rights since it offers no other reference
point for making moral choices than the choices — the acts of power
— of individuals. In articulating his own constructive proposal, how
ever, he presents what appear to be two understandings of freedom,
one that defines it as obedience to the natural law — the true and good
external to the self— and another that defines it in terms of one’s
communion with God and other human beings. In a comparison of
the two conceptions of freedom, I have suggested that the latter offers
the more encompassing framework. It locates the truth of freedom
neither in the will’s choices nor simply in an impersonal conception
of the true and good, but in the Christian trinitarian and christological
affirmation that, in Christ, ultimate power has constituted its identity
not only by endowing human beings with inviolable worth (in cre
ation) but by giving the divine self in Christ for the sake of witnessing
to their irreducible worth.22 It is only with reference to this source
22. I have attempted, in this argument, to work within the theological frame of
reference of Veritatis Splendor itself and therefore have appropriated the pope’s material
conception of the Christian life as a form of “perfection” and “imitation.” Nonethe
less, theform of my theological argument is distinctly Lutheran in that its final norm
for making theological judgments is the “crucified Christ” encountered in the Chris
tian gospel. A classic depiction of this form of theological argument —- in which the
crucified and risen Christ is the theological criterion for moving beyond either
legalism (a false heteronomy) or antinomianism (a false autonomy) is found in Martin
Luther’s “The Freedom of a Christian,” in Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings,
pp. 42-85.
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and norm — which radically transforms their own exercise of free
dom and power, whether as individuals or as church — that Christians
can witness to moral truth in response to the pressing ethical, social,
and political problems of our time.23

23. I am grateful to the following people for comments that have helped me to
sharpen my argument in this paper: Theo Dieter, Reinhard flutter, James F. Keenan,
Gilbert Meilaender, Ebcrhard Schockcnhoff, and William Schweiker.

